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1Introduction
The third Millennium Development Goal is to\Promote gender equality and empower women." In
this paper, we look at this objective in the context of an increasingly integrated world. Two related
questions come to mind when faced with the issue of globalization and the gender gap. First, how
does discrimination against women in
uence the way countries integrate into world markets? And
second, how does globalization in turn change countries' incentives to\promote gender equality and
empower women"?
To address these questions, we take the view of globalization as the expansion of trade in goods
and services, with changes in relative factor prices as a primary consequence. We therefore abstract
from other important socio-economic phenomena associated with globalization, such as cross-border
movements of capital and labor, or the worldwide spread of information, technology, culture, and
social norms, among other things. Our analysis of the interplay between globalization and gender
inequality instead emphasizes the distortionary eects of discrimination on trade patterns, and
reciprocally, the role that trade has in aecting the extent to which women are being discriminated
against.
To guide our discussion, we consider a two-sector specic factors model of international trade
(Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974), combined with a simplied occupational choice decision along the lines
of Roy (1951). The rst sector combines capital with female labor (henceforth the brain sector),
and the second combines capital with male labor (henceforth the brawn sector). Capital 
ows freely
across sectors, so the marginal products of capital equalize, and this determines the equilibrium
of the economy in autarky. To investigate the eect of world market integration, we consider two
otherwise similar countries that dier along two dimensions: (i) the relative productivity of the
brain versus brawn sectors, and (ii) the severity of gender discrimination, which is modeled as the
extent to which women are restricted from participating in the labor market. The former source of
heterogeneity re
ects Ricardian technology dierences, while the latter leads to Heckscher-Ohlin-
type dierences in female labor endowments. Under trade, capital 
ows to the sector in which
the country has a comparative advantage. Moreover, gender discrimination, by aecting relative
factor endowments, distorts trade patterns by either exacerbating or mitigating inherent Ricardian
comparative advantage.
The second stage of our theoretical discussion endogenizes the gender gap, and analyzes several
mechanisms through which trade opening will aect discrimination outcomes. When women's
empowerment is expressed through higher female labor force participation or lower fertility, we
examine how world market integration changes the trade-o between formal labor wages and the
marginal product of home production.1 Similarly, when looking at education, we analyze how trade
opening might aect the returns to girls' schooling. Finally, we propose a political economy model of
gender discrimination in which relative incomes within a household determine bargaining power and
men choose female labor force participation; men thus face the trade-o between increasing total
1In this paper, we view fertility solely as an indication of women's opportunity cost of formal labor.
1household income and a higher bargaining power of female household members as female earnings
increase. In all these cases, by aecting relative factor prices, trade alters the costs and benets
of restricting female participation in the labor force; countries that exhibit a larger comparative
advantage in the brain sector will tend to discriminate less against women, since such practice
comes at a larger cost.
We take the two main theoretical predictions of the model to the data. First, all else equal, countries
where gender discrimination is less severe have a comparative advantage in exporting goods that
are more intensive in the use of female labor. Second, under trade, countries with comparative
advantage in female intensive sectors will reduce the severity of gender discrimination. To test
these predictions, we use industry-level export data for 61 manufacturing sectors in 146 developed
and developing countries over 45 years. We measure a sector's female-labor intensity by its average
ratio of female to total employment among countries with full data coverage, and test whether,
consistent with the rst prediction, countries where women are more empowered tend to export
relatively more of the female-labor intensive goods. Next we follow the methodology of Almeida and
Wolfenzon (2005), and use a country's export shares in dierent sectors to aggregate the industry-
level measures of female labor intensity into a country-level measure of female-labor needs of exports
that captures a country's comparative advantage in female-labor intensive sectors. We use this
measure to test the second prediction: that gender discrimination is less severe in countries with a
comparative advantage in female-labor intensive sectors. In testing both predictions, we recognize
the possibility of endogeneity of our explanatory variable that comes from the model itself and
address it using instrumentation strategies. In the rst case, since the share of a country's exports
in a sector that is female-labor intensive may aect its attitude towards gender, we instrument
the attitude towards gender by a measure of the distribution of religions in the population. In
the second case, since the comparative advantage of a country in female-labor intensive sectors
depend on its attitude towards gender, we follow the methodology of Do and Levchenko (2007),
and instrument for the female-labor needs of exports by a measure of a country's exogenously
determined comparative advantage in these sectors using export weights predicted by sector-level
gravity equations. These instrumentation strategies are described and justied in more detail in
section 2 below.
The results support the main empirical predictions of the model. Countries with higher degrees of
women's empowerment, whether it is measured by higher female labor force participation, lower
fertility, or higher female educational attainment, have a signicantly larger export shares in sectors
that are intensive in the use of female labor, controlling for industry and country xed eects. This
nding is specially strong in two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that instrument for the
possible endogeneity of gender attitudes with respect to export composition. Moving from the
25th to the 75 percentile in a gender gap variable increases the export share in a sector at the
75th percentile of female intensity by between 0.7 and 1.89 percentage points more compared to a
sector at the 25th percentile of female intensity, depending on the gender gap measure. Similarly,
countries that have a comparative advantage in the production of female-labor intensive goods tend
2to exhibit relatively greater female empowerment, especially in terms of a lower fertility rate, and
to a lesser extent in terms of educational attainment and labor force participation. For instance,
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the distribution of the female-labor needs of exports
lowers fertility by as much as 0.21 births per woman, or about 0.37 standard deviations of average
fertility across countries.
Our paper builds on the assumption that male and female labor are not perfect substitutes. This
assumption has also been the cornerstone of recent empirical analyzes by Galor and Weil (1996),
Black and Juhn (2000), Qian (2008), Alesina et al. (2011), and Pitt et al. (2010), among others.
By examining the eect of trade on various measures of the gender gap, the analysis conducted in
this paper relates to an emerging literature on the eect of trade liberalization on female outcomes
(Rendall, 2010; Oostendorp, 2009; Aguayo-Tellez et al., 2010). Finally, our paper belongs to the
broader\Institutions and Trade"literature, which examines both how institutions become a source
of comparative advantage (e.g. Beck, 2003; Levchenko, 2007), as well as how trade in turn in
uences
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Braun and Raddatz, 2008; Do and Levchenko, 2007, 2009;
Segura-Cayuela, 2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a simple two-country two-sector
model of trade with gender discrimination. It then proposes and analyzes mechanisms to endogenize
the gender gap. Section 2 lays out our empirical strategy to test the predictions of the model.
Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 presents estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
1 A Model of Trade with Gender Discrimination
1.1 The Environment
We consider a two-country, two-sector model. Countries are indexed by i 2 fX;Y g and sectors are
















Instead of considering sectors of relative brain versus brawn intensities, we restrict attention to a
specic-factors model of production:
Y i




M (KM;LM) = MiK
ML1 
M ;
where LF and LM are, respectively, the amount of female labor and male labor employed in
production, and KF and KM are the amounts of capital employed in each sector. Thus, men and
women are assumed not to be substitutes of each other; we take the arguably simplistic view that
3men supply brawn-only labor, while women supply brain-only labor.2
Countries are characterized by endowments of female labor  Li
F, male labor  Li
M and capital  Ki.
Capital can move freely between sectors, and the market clearing condition for capital implied that
Ki
F + Ki
M =  Ki. To capture the notion of gender discrimination, we set  Li
M = 1 for i 2 fX;Y g;
while female labor supply is given by  Li
F = 1   i in country i. The parameters i capture the
extent to which female labor supply is being restricted in country i. We can either think of i as
actual restrictions on women's participation in the labor force (discrimination, social norms, etc.),
or female schooling restrictions so that
 
1   i
measures \eective" female labor supply. In this
model, trade will be driven by both Ricardian (relative productivity of sectors A and B will dier
across countries) and Heckscher-Ohlin (countries will dier by their eective endowment of female
labor) motives.
In country i, capital is rented out at rate ri and female and male workers are paid wages wi
F and wi
M,
respectively. The price of the M-good is set to be numeraire, and the price of F goods is denoted pi.
Given the prevailing extent of discrimination against women (i), all the goods and factor markets












i2fX;Y g, such that (i) consumers maximize utility; (ii) rms maximize
prots; (iii) all goods and factor markets clear. In the rest of the section, we will rst solve the
equilibrium of the economy when countries are in autarky, and compare these outcomes to the case
in which goods can be traded freely across countries so that the law of one price holds. We will
then propose several mechanisms to endogenize i; the extent of gender imbalance in country i:
1.2 Autarky
To characterize the autarky equilibrium, we look at (i) the rst order conditions for optimizing
rms and consumers, and (ii) market clearing conditions. For convenience, we will express all the
unknown parameters of the economy (prices and quantities) as functions of f =
 K
KM ; which is a
measure of the size of the female-labor intensive sector. To simplify notation, this section drops
the country superscripts.
Firms' optimization
In each of the two sectors, rms rent capital and hire labor to maximize prots. In other words,
sector M rms solve the following program:
max
K;L
MKL1    rK   wML
2In the rest of the paper, we will use female-labor (resp. male-labor) or brain (resp. brawn) intensive sectors
interchangeably.
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)MK





Similarly, sector F rms choose capital and demand labor to maximize
max
K;L
pFKL1    rK   wFL:
















Finally, the rst-order conditions with respect to L determine female wages:












(f   1): (4)
Consumers' optimization and market clearing conditions
Cobb-Douglas utility implies constant expenditure shares on the two goods:
pCF = E
CM = (1   )E;
where expenditure is equal to aggregate income, which is derived from wages paid to labor and
rental of capital:
E = r  K + wF (1   ) + wM:
Therefore, aggregate consumption of good F is
CF = 
r  K + wF (1   ) + wM
p
: (5)
The market clearing condition for good F (equivalently for good M, since Walras' law holds)
equalizes consumption and production:

r  K + wF (1   ) + wM
p
= FK
F (1   )
1  :
Substituting for goods and factor prices from (4), (2), and (3) and rearranging gives us the following
5expression for equilibrium capital allocation:
(1   )f = 1: (6)
Equilibrium characterization










KM = (1   )  K
KF =   K
:
The allocation of capital across sectors does not depend on , the extent of gender discrimination.
Any restriction in labor supply is compensated by an increase in female wages, with unit elasticity
of substitution (Cobb-Douglas), so that the factor rewards are independent of . To see this, let's







1  (1   )(1   )
 M  K
wM = (1   )(1   )
 M  K
; (7)






1  (1   )(1   )
 M  K
wMLM = (1   )(1   )
 M  K
;
which means that relative total labor income of women to men is entirely determined by the relative
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CF = (1   )
1  F  K
CM = (1   )
 M  K
; (10)
which implies that autarky equilibrium welfare is equal to
U = FM1 
h





The main lesson from the autarky case is that general equilibrium forces put a natural limit on
the \eectiveness" of gender discrimination: restricting the female labor supply bids up the price
of the goods produced by women, and therefore women's wage. Though under the Cobb-Douglas
assumption, the general equilibrium force perfectly osets discrimination { in the sense that the
total female labor income in the economy is independent of  { this force is of course much more
general, and will still operate under non-unitary elasticities of substitution.
1.3 Trade
Now suppose countries can freely trade goods with each other. A superscript i 2 fX;Y g indexes
the countries. We follow the same approach as in the autarky case to solve for the equilibrium
allocation of resources. The only dierences lie in the goods market clearing condition that now
aggregates consumption and production from both countries, and prices of good F that equalize
across countries.
Firms' and consumers' optimization
Following the same steps as in autarky, we can obtain expressions for equilibrium prices in each
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7Market clearing conditions and law of one price
In sector F, world consumption and production equalize, so that
X
i
























1   (1   )fi
= 0: (13)

























1  1   i
1    i:
A value  > 1 indicates that country i has a comparative advantage in good F; i.e. the female-labor








1  and an institutional or Hecksher-Ohlin component 1 i
1  i, which can ex-
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The rst equation of (15) is the world market clearing condition for good F: It consists of two terms
that add up to zero. Thus, we have the rst implication: for i 2 fX;Y g





(1   )f i  1

:
In words, and since (1   )f = 1 in autarky, it means that the female sector shrinks in country
i as a consequence of trade if and only if it expands in i0s trade partner. Intuitively, this rst
result means that countries will specialize when they open to trade. If we now examine the law







: the country with
comparative advantage in the female-labor intensive good ends up having a larger brain sector.
These two results together imply the following equivalence:








In summary, we have the following result:
Proposition 1: Autarky vs. trade outcomes As a result of trade opening, capital 
ows into
the sector for which the country has a comparative advantage in production.
Proof: Follows immediately as an interpretation of equivalence (16).
Take i; the country with comparative advantage in the female sector. Since capital will 
ow into
the female sector, interest rates will increase accordingly as capital is now put to more productive
use ( @ri
@fi > 0). At the same time, the price of the brain-intensive good will increase, driven by
demand from country  i :
@p
@fi > 0. Consequently, nominal wages will increase for women, and
decrease for men (
@wi
F
@fi > 0 and
@wi
M
@fi < 0), so that the wage gap (dened as male to female wage









Furthermore, since the price of the A good is higher in i under trade than it was in autarky, consump-







< 1, while consumption of good B will
increase by a factor








Proposition 2: Comparative statics If comparative advantage in the female-intensive sector
is accentuated (i increases), then in the trade equilibrium more capital will 







Proof: See Mathematical Appendix.
This section formalizes the intuition that trade opening induces countries to specialize in their
comparative advantage industry, with the associated implications for capital allocation and female
9wages (Proposition 1). Comparative advantage in our model is a combination of both techno-
logical and institutional dierences. An exacerbation of these dierences induces an even larger
in
ow of capital in the female-labor intensive sector, with the corresponding female wage increase
(Proposition 2). We thus have the rst prediction of the model:
Prediction 1: Gender discrimination is a source of Heckscher-Ohlin comparative disadvantage:
countries that discriminate more against women are less likely to export female-labor intensive
goods.
1.4 Endogenizing the Gender Gap
The previous subsection laid out the basic model of trade in which countries dier in both technology
and supply of female labor. In this subsection, we introduce several mechanisms that endogenize the
gender discrimination parameter of the model, namely i: Since comparative advantage in female-
intensive industries implies higher wages for women, the\returns to gender discrimination"decrease
with the extent of female intensity in production.
1.4.1 Fertility and the gender gap in labor force participation
The rst extension of this model is to endogenize 1   , viewed as the measure of female labor
force participation or fertility. We therefore consider a continuum of couples (husband, wife) of
measure one, and investigate their time allocation decisions. To that end, we assume that men
always supply one unit of labor, while women choose , the amount of time they spend at home
in home production; child rearing would be a natural way to think of home activities. Households
also own  Ki units of capital invested in production. Finally, we assume that home production is





that are measured in
utility terms.3 Households take the vector of prices as given and make their investment decisions
accordingly; in other words, they maximize their indirect utility
max
()















 (1   )
2 ;
in which goods consumption decisions have been maximized out. Consequently, the optimal choice












 (1   )
2
which gives








3Note that v () =  
1
2
 (1   )
2 up to a constant.















 (1   )
1 
i
: Equation (17) denes the labor supply curve. As expected,
labor force participation (resp. fertility) is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of the prevailing
female wage, as picture in Figure 1, panel A. We now close the model in autarky and trade,
respectively.
Labor force participation in autarky Plugging in the autarky expressions for wF and p from

















 (1   )
 
Fi  
Mi1     Ki

: Equation (18) denes
the labor demand curve as pictured in Figure 1 panel A, and re
ects the fact that female labor
force participation exerts a downward pressure on female wages.
The equilibrium female labor force participation in autarky is therefore the unique intersection










2    (1   )
:
Labor force participation under trade Using the expression for wF and p under trade from







(1   )fi   1






















2    (1   )
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11if and only if
g















if and only if
i > 1:
The labor demand curve therefore shifts up (resp. down) when the country has a comparative
advantage in the female-labor (resp. male-labor) intensive good. Thus, the country that has a
comparative advantage in the female-intensive sector will increase female labor force participation
as a consequence of trade opening.
Prediction 2a: Countries that have a comparative advantage in the female intensive good have
higher female labor force participation and lower fertility once they open to trade. The reverse
holds for countries with a comparative dis-advantage in brain intensive goods.
1.4.2 Trade and the gender gap in education
Another pathway through which trade opening can impact countries dierentially is through in-
vestments in education. By aecting the relative returns to male versus female labor, trade might
alter the nature of gender-biased parental investments in education. To capture the notion of edu-
cation in our model, we assume that (1   ) is the supply of\eective labor,"given that education
increases the productivity of labor. We also consider a dynastic model whereby parents are born at
the beginning of a period t with endowment  Ki of capital; the mother has education (1   t) that
allows her to supply (1   t) units of eective labor. Parents produce and make their consumption
decisions. They have two children, one boy and one girl and choose to invest et in educating their
girl at cost 1
2e2
t, which is measured in utility terms. Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we
abstract from boys' education. The investment sets the next generation's education following the
law of motion 1   t+1 = f (1   t;et): f (:) is assumed to have the standard regularity properties.
Parents' optimization program takes future wages as given and maximizes:








Ft (1   t)  
1
2
e2 + Vt+1 (1   t+1)

subject to
1   t+1 = f (1   t;e):
12The rst-order condition gives
et = fe (1   t;et)V 0
t+1 (1   t+1);
while the envelope theorem yields:
V 0








We consequently have the following Euler equation, which denes the demand for education:
et =
 (1   )
1 








To simplify, we assume that f (1   ;e) = e so that Euler equation (19) fully denes the labor
supply curve:
1   t =










ln(1   t) = ln










This equation is identical to (17) up to a constant, and thus all of the derivations regarding the
impact of trade opening on  carry over from the previous case. Note that, given the simplication
assumption made for the law of motion of education, the economy converges to its steady state
immediately and the analysis of the properties of the steady state is identical to the labor-force-
participation/fertility case.
Prediction 2b: Countries that have a comparative advantage in the brain-intensive good reduce
the gender gap in education when they open to trade. The reverse holds for countries with a
comparative dis-advantage in brain intensive goods.
1.4.3 The political economy of gender discrimination
Finally, to model the endogenous choice of i in a political economy setting, we depart from the
unitary household, and assume that husbands and wives bargain over aggregate income so that






















































is the husband's bargaining weight. The bargaining weight is increasing in the husband's real income
(!1 (:) > 0) while decreasing in the wife's (!2 (:) < 0). Furthermore, if we assume that bargaining
power is unchanged if both incomes are equally in























Finally, in this political economy model, men choose the level of gender discrimination i to max-




. In doing so, we assume that they internalize the
general equilibrium eects of their policy decision :
Gender discrimination in autarky Plugging in autarky equilibrium wages from (7) and drop-
ping country superscripts, bargaining power in autarky is given by







which is independent of : The bargaining power of husbands is unaected when they restrict
female labor force participation since any restriction will induce an increase in wages that will
keep payments to female labor constant. In our model, any partial equilibrium eect associated
with a restriction on female labor supply (higher ) is fully oset by general equilibrium eects.
Although the extreme result is driven by the unit elasticity of substitution specic to Cobb-Douglas
specications for both preferences and technology, the mechanism is still robust to alternative
functional forms and works as follows: a reduction in female eective labor supply decreases output
in the A sector that induces prices of A goods to go up. This is captured in the expression (9) for
prices. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the price response is exactly equal to output shortage, so that the
allocation of capital across sectors is invariant to changes in : As a consequence of the price hike,
female labor becomes relatively more productive and this translates into higher wages for women.
Unit elasticity of substitution implies that total labor income is unaected by  (cf. equation 8).
Therefore, any restriction in female supply only aects consumption levels through lower production
(cf. equation 10); ultimately, welfare is adversely aected without any change in men's bargaining
power (cf. equation 11). The autarky gender discrimination level is therefore minimal:  = 0:




















































+  (1   ) (20)
= 0
The right-hand side of (20) consists of three terms. The rst term is the change in husbands'
bargaining power. An increase in female labor force participation results in an increase in the
country's comparative advantage in female good production, inducing an increase of the relative
income of women. This in turn reduces husbands' bargaining power, since 
(:) is decreasing in f.
The second term is the allocative eect: an increase in female labor supply will induce the male
sector to shrink, pushing female wages up but also price of the female good up. The net eect on
real income is therefore ambiguous and is positive if and only if 1   
f
f 1 > 0, i.e. if and only if
country i has a comparative advantage in the female-labor intensive good; when a reallocation of
capital across sectors decreases the gains from trade (i.e. when capital 
ows into the female-labor
[resp. male-labor] intensive sector in the country with comparative advantage in the male-labor
[resp. female-labor] intensive good), the eect on real income is negative. On the contrary, when
capital movements make countries more dierent, the gains from trade increase. Finally, the third
term is the real income eect of an increased aggregate supply of the female-labor intensive good,
which pushes prices down.
Prediction 2c: Both countries increase discrimination against women when they open to trade.
However the increase in discrimination is more pronounced when the country has a comparative
dis-advantage in the female-labor intensive sector.
2 Empirical Strategy
The model of international trade and gender inequality developed above has two main predictions.
When female participation in labor markets
 
1   i
is taken as given, countries with lower par-
ticipation will have a comparative disadvantage in the production of female-labor intensive goods,
and will export relatively less of these goods. This rst prediction comes from the Hecksher-Ohlin
aspects of the model. A lower female participation, resulting either from cultural or economic
forces, eectively makes the country relatively less abundant in female labor and reduces the force
to export these goods that arises purely from dierences in factor endowments.
15The model also recognizes that in the longer run, a country's comparative advantage has an impact
on women's wages and thus their incentives to participate in the formal labor markets. If a country
has a comparative advantage in the goods that are produced by women, female wages will rise and
women will have a greater incentive to participate in the formal labor markets and invest in the
types of human capital that will be valued by the formal economy. By contrast, when a country has
a comparative advantage in the goods produced primarily by males, women's incentives to invest
in human capital and participate in the formal labor markets will decrease with trade openness.
This is the second empirical prediction that we test below. Both of these predictions suggest that
what matters most for how globalization aects the relative status of women in the society is not
simply the level of overall trade openness, but the country's comparative advantage. Conversely,
the status of women should aect not just overall trade volumes, but also trade patterns in the
shorter-run.
To test these predictions empirically, we measure an industry's female-labor intensity FLi as the
share of female workers in the total employment in sector i. We take this measure as a technolog-
ically determined industry characteristic that does not vary across countries. Using this measure,
we rst estimate the following regression in a cross-section of industries across countries:
SHAREic = FLi  GENDERc + 
c + 
i + ic; (21)
where SHAREic is the average share of good i in country c total exports, GENDERc is a measure
of women's participation in the labor force or human capital investment in country c, and 
c and

i are country and industry xed eects, respectively. This specication allows us to test the rst
prediction about the relation between female participation and comparative advantage. If women's
labor force participation is a source of comparative advantage in sectors that are brain intensive,
the coecient  would be signicantly positive for measures of female participation and negative
for measures of exclusion. To address the endogeneity of GENDERc predicted by our model,
we instrument it by the composition of religions in a country. Specically, for each country, we
construct two variables that are the proportions of the population that is Muslim and Christian,
respectively. The interactions FLi  MUSLIMc and FLi  CHRISTIANc are then used to
instrument for the interaction FLi  GENDERc:4 It is important to note that we do not claim
that religion variables are valid instruments for the variable GENDERc; since country xed eects
are not excluded from the rst stage. Rather, the identication assumption is valid if, conditional
on country and industry xed eects, the interaction between religious composition of country c
and the female-labor intensive character of industry i aects the share of good i in country c total
exports only through its eect on the interaction between gender discrimination in country c and
the female-labor intensive character of industry i.
Starting from the same measure of an industry's female-labor intensity FLi, we can also test the
second prediction that comparative advantage shapes female labor participation and exclusion. To
4Our results are similar if we use FLi  MUSLIMc as the only instrument for FLi  GENDERc:
16this end, we rst measure the \gender content" of each country's comparative advantage. In order
to do this, we follow Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) and construct for each country and time period,






where i indexes sectors, c countries, and t time periods. In this expression, !ict is the share of sector
i exports in country c's total exports to the rest of the world in time period t. Thus, FLNXct
in eect measures the gender composition of exports in country c. This measure will be high if a
country exports mostly in sectors with a large female share of employment, and vice versa.
Using this variable, we would like to estimate the following equation in the cross-section of countries:
GENDERc =  + FLNXc + 
Zc + "c: (23)
The left-hand side variable, GENDERc; is a measure of women's participation in the labor force
or human capital investment, and Zc is a vector of controls. The main hypothesis is that the eect
of comparative advantage in brain-intensive sectors, FLNX, on women's labor market outcomes
is positive ( > 0). To deal with reverse causality, we implement an instrumentation strategy
that follows Do and Levchenko (2007), and exploits exogenous geographical characteristics of coun-
tries, along with how those exogenous characteristics aect international trade in dierent sectors
dierentially. The construction of the instrument is described in Appendix B.
We also exploit the time variation in the variables to estimate a panel specication of the type
GENDERct =  + FLNXct + 
Zct + 
c + 
t + "ct; (24)
where country and time xed eects are denoted by 
c and 
t respectively. The advantage of the
panel specication is that the use of xed eects allows us to control for a wide range of omitted
variables, and identify the coecient purely from the time variation in comparative advantage
and women's outcomes within a country over time. The panel estimation is carried out on non-
overlapping 5-year averages, to sweep out any variation at the business cycle frequencies.
Our main GENDERc measure is fertility, measured by the total number of births per woman.
Since women typically bear the primary responsibility for caring for their children, a greater num-
ber of children will eectively reduce a woman's capacity to supply labor to the formal labor market.
The key advantage of a variable like fertility is that unlike other indicators of female labor supply,
the number of births per woman is likely to be measured quite precisely in all countries and at all
levels of development. We also check whether results are robust to two additional measures: female
labor force participation and female educational attainment. Female labor force participation is
perhaps the most direct indicator of the outcome of interest for this study, but it is also likely to
be measured with greater error, especially in poorer countries with large informal sectors. Female
17educational attainment is measured by the average years of schooling of females over 15 years of
age. This variable measures women's investment in human capital, which can be interpreted as
making women more suitable for formal sector employment. Note, however, that this variable's
relationship to female labor supply is probably less straightforward, since staying in school longer
actually reduces one's labor supply in the short to medium run. To summarize, these three out-
come variables are intended to test the prediction of the model that when trade expands women's
employment opportunities, they will respond by raising their labor supply and investing in human
capital (predictions 2a, 2b and 2c).
The controls include PPP-adjusted per capita income, overall trade openness, and, in the case of
cross-sectional regressions, regional dummies. Our cross-sectional specications are estimates on
long-run averages for the period 1962-2007, while in the panel specications the unit of time is a
5-year period, so all the variables are 5-year averages. The data span 1962 to 2007 in the best of
cases, though not all variables are available for all time periods.
3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
The key indicator required for the analysis is the share of female workers in the total employment
in each sector. We obtain this information from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (IND-
STAT4 2009). This database contains information on the total employment and female employment
in each manufacturing sector for a large number of countries, starting in the late 1990s. The data
are available at the 3-digit ISIC Revision 3 classication (61 distinct sectors). In order to construct
the share of female workers in total employment in sector i, FLi, we take the mean of this value
across the countries for which these data are available and relatively complete. The resulting sam-
ple includes eleven countries in each of the developed and developing sub-samples: Austria, Malta,
Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Japan, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Korea, Italy, Ireland;
and Indonesia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan, India, Philippines, Malaysia, Chile, Morocco, Egypt,
Thailand. Table 1 reports the values of FLi in our sample of sectors. It is clear that there is wide
variation in the share of women in sectoral employment. While the mean is 27 percent, these values
range from the high of 71 percent in Wearing Apparel and 62 percent in Knitted and Crocheted
Fabrics to the low of 8 or 9 percent in Motor Vehicles, Bodies of Motor Vehicles, Building and
Repairing of Ships, and Railway Locomotives.5
The export shares !X
ict are calculated based on the COMTRADE database, which contains bilateral
trade data starting in 1962 in the SITC revision 1 and 2 classication. The trade data are then
aggregated up to the ISIC Revision 3 classication using a concordance developed by the authors.
5One may be concerned that these values are very dierent across countries in general, and across developed and
developing countries in particular. However, it turns out that the rankings of sectors are remarkably similar across
countries. The values of FLi computed on the OECD and non-OECD samples have a correlation of 0.89. Pooling
all the countries together, the rst principal component explains 77 percent of the cross-sectoral variation across
countries, suggesting that rankings are very similar. We also experimented with taking alternative averages: medians
instead of means across countries; and dropping outlier values of female shares in individual sectors. The results were
very similar.
18Data on female labor force participation and fertility are sourced from the World Bank's World
Development indicators, while information on female educational attainment comes from the Barro-
Lee database. Controls { PPP-adjusted per capita income and overall trade openness { come from
the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2002).
Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the female content of exports for the OECD and non-
OECD country groups. We can see that for the OECD, these averages are slightly lower, at about
0.25, and stable across decades. For the non-OECD countries, the female content of exports is
higher, between 0.27 and 0.30, and, if anything, rising over time. Notably, the dispersion among
the non-OECD countries is both much larger than among the OECD, and increasing over time.
While the OECD sample, the standard deviation is stable at 0.03-0.04, for the non-OECD is rises
monotonically from 0.08 to 0.12 between the 1960s and the 2000s.
Tables 3a to 3c report, for the dierent time periods, the countries with highest and lowest FLNX
values. Typically, countries with the highest values of female content of exports are those that
export mostly textiles and wearing apparel, while countries with the lowest FLNX are natural
resource exporters. Equally important for our empirical strategy are changes over time. Tables 4a
and 4b report the countries with the largest positive and negative changes in FLNX between the
1960s and today. We can see that relative to the cross-sectional variation, the time variation is also
considerable. Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the country-level variables of interest and
controls. Our nal dataset contains country-level variables on up to 146 countries.
4 Regression Results
Table 6 reports the results of estimating the impact of the gender gap on comparative advantage
in trade, i.e. eq. (21). The top panel presents the OLS results, the bottom panel the two-stage
least squares results in which the interaction of FLi with GENDERc is instrumented with the
interactions of FLi with shares of Muslims and Christians in the population. All columns control
include country and sector dummies. Columns 2, 4, and 6 in addition include the interaction terms
means to capture Heckscher-Ohlin specialization forces, following the empirical model of Romalis
(2004): capital intensity of sector i is interacted with capital abundance of country c, and skill
intensity of sector i is interacted with skill abundance of country c.6 We can see that the gender
gap has a clear impact on trade 
ows, especially when the gender gap measures are instrumented
with religious composition. The bottom of Panel B reports the rst-stage results. The rst-stage
coecients are highly statistically signicant, and the instruments are comfortably strong in the
econometric sense. The estimates are economically signicant: moving from the 25th to the 75
percentile in a gender gap variable increases the export share in a sector at the 75th percentile
6Capital intensity is computed as the share of value added not going to labor compensation, and is built using
the UNIDO database. Skill intensity is computed as the fraction of the total wage bill corresponding to workers
with at least some college education in the US (originally obtained from Autor et al., 1998; and translated from the
US Census Industrial Classication (CIC) into ISIC Rev. 3 industries using a correspondence built by the authors).
Country-level skill and capital abundance are sourced from Hall and Jones (1999).
19of female intensity by between 0.7 and 1.89 percentage points more than in a sector at the 25th
percentile of female intensity, depending on the GENDERc measure.
We next present the results of testing for the opposite eect: the role of comparative advantage in
determining attitudes towards gender. Table 7 reports the results of estimating the cross-sectional
specication in equation (23), focusing on fertility as the outcome variable. All of the specications
control for income per capita and overall openness, and columns 2-4 and 6-7 also include population
as an additional control. Both left-hand side and the right-hand side variables are in natural logs.
Columns 1 and 2 report the simple OLS results for fertility. There is a highly signicant negative
relationship: greater female content of exports is associated with lower fertility, exactly as theory
would predict. Columns 3 and 4 explore the impact of comparative advantage on the other gender
gap measures: female labor force participation and female educational attainment. We can see that
the OLS coecients are marginally signicant, and with the expected sign. Columns 5 through 8
report the 2SLS results, in which the instrument is the female content of exports as predicted based
purely on geographical characteristics, described in Appendix B. For the main outcome variable of
interest, fertility, the 2SLS coecient is signicant at the one-percent level. For the other outcome
variables, the coecient retains the correct sign but is not robustly signicant.7 The bottom panel
of columns 4 through 6 report the rst-stage results. The rst stage is quite strong: the instrument
is highly signicant as a predictor of actual female content of exports. The partial F-statistics
indicate that the instrument is strong in the econometric sense. The estimates are economically
signicant. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the distribution of the female content
of exports lowers fertility by as much as 0.21 births per woman, or about 0.37 standard deviations
of average fertility across countries.
Table 8 presents the panel results. All of the specications control for per capita income, openness,
and population. The rst column presents the pooled estimates on fertility without any xed
eects. The second column adds country eects, while column 3, both country and time eects.
The impact of FNLX on fertility is of the expected sign and signicant at 1% level throughout.
This is a powerful result: country eects control for all the unobservable features of countries that
do not vary over time, such as geography and climate, ethnic and religious composition, and so
on. Thus, the coecients in column 2 and 3 are identied from changes in the variables within
a country over time. Columns 4 and 5 present the pooled estimates and the estimates with both
country and time eects for female labor force participation, while columns 6 and 7 do the same
for female educational attainment. As was the case in the cross-section, the results for these two
outcome variables are not robust. For both outcome variables, the inclusion of time eects renders
the coecient estimate not signicant, and of the \wrong" sign. It appears that over the past 40
years, there has been a common time trend in both FLNX and these outcome variables, and thus
7When the adopted measure of attitude toward gender is either female labor force participation or education
attainment, the results are not robust to the inclusion of region xed eects. The nding is not surprising given the
high spatial correlation of our variables of interest. We indeed expect dierences in attitude towards gender to be
higher between rather than within geographical regions. The fertility results are fully robust to the inclusion of region
dummies.
20controlling for this trend leaves no variation that can be exploited to identify these coecients.8
Our main industry-level female intensity variable (FL) is computed as the average share of female
workers in each sector in a sample of some 20 developed and developing countries. We favor this
measure because it is most representative of the female intensity of sectors in an average country.
However, a drawback of our main measure is that it does not include non-manufacturing sectors. To
check robustness of our results, we implement an alternative strategy, of constructing a measure of
FL based on data for a single country { the U.S.. We thus use the Labor Force Statistics database
of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Using data from the Current Population Survey,
the BLS publishes \Women in the Labor Force: A Databook" on an annual basis since 2005. It
contains information on total employment and the female share of employment in each industry
covered by the Census. The data are available at the 4-digit U.S. Census 2007 classication (262
distinct sectors, including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing). In order to construct the
share of female workers in total employment in sector i, FLi, we take the mean of this value across
the years for which the data on the female share of employment are available (2004-2009). The
resulting sample includes 78 manufacturing and 15 non-manufacturing sectors. Appendix Table A1
reports the values of FLi for the top and bottom 5 sectors according to U.S. data. These sectors
are similar to what we nd in our baseline measure: the least female-intensive sectors tend to be
in heavy machinery, while the most female-intensive sectors in textiles and apparel. Appendix
Table A1 presents the basic summary statistics of the U.S.-based FL measure, breaking up the
manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors.
While the U.S.-based alternative FL measure has the advantage of extending the set of sectors
to agriculture and mining, it has two important drawbacks. First, the data are compiled based
on individual-level surveys rather than rm- or plant-level data, and thus relies on workers self-
reporting their industry of occupation. Thus, if the number of individuals in the survey who report
working in a particular sector is small, or if workers make mistakes in reporting their industry of
employment, the data will be measured with error. And second, the U.S. is only one, very special
country, and thus its values of of FL may not be representative of the average country's experience.9
Both of these considerations will raise the amount of measurement error on the right-hand side,
leading to attenuation bias in the coecients.
With these caveats in mind, Appendix Tables A3 through A5 replicate all of the regression estimates
in the paper using the U.S.-based FL indicator instead. We can see that by and large, the results
using our main measure of gender gap { fertility { are robust. However, the other two outcome
variables, that are marginally signicant in our main results, are less so here.
8For these two outcome variables, adding country eects but no time eects produces marginally signicant
coecients with the right sign, implying that the time eects are responsible for changing the sign of the coecient.
9For our UNIDO-based measure, averaging of the share of female workers across a couple of dozen countries helps
alleviate both of these problems.
215 Conclusion
We have analyzed both theoretically and empirically the interplay between trade and discrimination
against women. The main ndings suggest that gender equality is a source of comparative advantage
when a country integrates into world markets. Reciprocally, trade is found to aect societies'
attitudes towards gender.
Our results go beyond positing an unequivocal relationship between overall trade openness and
gender inequality. Instead, we emphasize the heterogeneity of the eects of trade on countries'
industrial structures and attitudes towards women. On the one hand, industries that rely relatively
more on female labor will expand more in countries where women are empowered. On the other
hand, we nd a lower gender gap in countries that export more goods that require female labor to
be produced.
From a policy perspective, these results indicate that countries with technologically-based compara-
tive advantage in male-labor intensive goods will have to undertake a larger eort to counterbalance
the economic forces, leading to a slower pace of women's empowerment compared to countries with
a comparative advantage in female-labor intensive goods. Nonetheless, these same eorts will re-
duce the impact of comparative advantage on the incentives for female labor force participation,
and further feed the conditions to empower women. In an increasingly integrated world market, the
road to female empowerment is paradoxically very specic to each country's productive structure
and exposure to world markets.
A Mathematical Appendix
From equation (??), let's try to characterize the behavior of f when the patterns of comparative
advantage  are changing.
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23We can now compute the local derivative of f with respect to  :
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The second and third terms of the equation are always positive, since f > 1: And by virtue of (16),
the rst term
(1 )f 1
 1 > 0: We thus have
f0 () > 0
Q.E.D.
B Instrumentation Strategy
This Appendix describes the steps necessary to build the instrument for the female content of
exports. The construction of the instrument follows Do and Levchenko (2007), and exploits exoge-
nous geographic characteristics of countries together with the empirically observed regularity that
trade responds dierentially to the standard gravity forces across sectors. For each industry i, we
estimate the Frankel and Romer (1999) gravity specication, which relates observed trade 
ows to
exogenous geographic variables:
LogXicd = i + 1
i ldistcd + 2
i lpopc + 3
ilareac + 4




i bordercd + 8
i bordercdldistcd +
9
ibordercd  popc + 10
i bordercdareac + 11
i bordercdpopd +
12
i bordercdaread + 13
i bordercdlandlockedcd + icd;
where LogXicd is the log of exports as a share of GDP in industry i, from country c to country d.
The right-hand side consists of the geographical variables. In particular, ldistcd is the log of distance
between the two countries, dened as distance between the major cities in the two countries, lpopc
is the log of population of country c, lareac log of land area, landlockedcd takes the value of 0, 1,
or 2 depending on whether none, one, or both of the trading countries are landlocked, and bordercd
is the dummy variable for common border. The right-hand side of the specication is identical
to the one Frankel and Romer (1999) use. We use bilateral trade 
ows from the COMTRADE
database, converted to the 3-digit ISIC Revision 3 classication. To estimate the gravity equation,
the bilateral trade 
ows Xicd are averaged over the period 1980-2007. This allows to smooth out
24any short-run variation in trade shares across sectors, and reduce the impact of zero observations.
Having estimated equation (25) for each industry, we then obtain the predicted logarithm of industry
i exports to GDP from country c to each of its trading partners indexed by d, \ LogXicd. In order to
construct the predicted overall industry i exports as a share of GDP from country c, we then take
the exponential of the predicted bilateral log of trade, and sum over the trading partner countries







That is, predicted total trade as a share of GDP for each industry and country is the sum of the
predicted bilateral trade to GDP over all trading partners. This exercise extends and modies the
Frankel and Romer (1999) methodology in two respects. First, and most importantly, it constructs
the Frankel and Romer (1999) predicted trade measures by industry. And second, rather than
looking at total trade, it looks solely at exports.
Do and Levchenko (2007) discuss and justify this strategy at length. As mentioned above, the
objective is to predict trade patterns, not trade volumes. How can this procedure yield dierent
predictions for ^ Xic across sectors if all of the geographical characteristics on the right-hand side
of equation (25) do not vary by sector? Note that the procedure estimates an individual gravity
equation for each sector. Thus, crucially for this strategy, if the vector of estimated gravity coef-
cients hi diers across sectors, so will the predicted total exports ^ Xic across sectors i within the
same country. Indeed, Do and Levchenko (2007) show that the variation in these coecients across
sectors is substantial, generating variation in predicted trade patterns across countries.
There is another potentially important issue, namely the zero trade observations. In our gravity
sample, only about two-thirds of the possible exporter-importer pairs record positive exports, in
any sector. At the level of individual industry, on average only a third of possible country-pairs
have strictly positive exports, in spite of the coarse level of aggregation.10 We follow the Do and
Levchenko (2007) procedure, and deal with zero observations in two ways. First, following the large
majority of gravity studies, we take logs of trade values, and thus their baseline gravity estimation
procedure ignores zeros. However, instead of predicting in-sample, we use the estimated gravity
model to predict out-of-sample. Thus, for those observations that are zero or missing and are not
used in the actual estimation, we still predict trade.11 In the second approach, we instead estimate
the gravity regression in levels using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator suggested
by (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The advantage of this procedure is that it actually includes
zero observations in the estimation, and can predict both zero and non- zero trade values in-sample
10These two calculations make the common assumption that missing trade observations represent zeros (see Help-
man et al., 2008).
11More precisely, for a given exporter-importer pair, we predict bilateral exports out-of-sample for all 61 sectors as
long as there is any bilateral exports for that country pair in at least one of the 61 sectors.
25from the same estimated equation. Its disadvantage is that it assumes a particular likelihood
function, and is not (yet) a standard way of estimating gravity equations found in the literature.
It turns out that the two are quite close to each other, an indication that the zeros problem is not
an important one for this empirical strategy. This paper only reports the results of implementing
the rst approach. The results of using the second one are available upon request.
Armed with a working model for predicting exports to GDP in each industry i, it is straightforward
to construct the instrument for the female content of exports, based on predicted export patterns






Here, the predicted share of total exports in industry i in country c, b !X
ic, is constructed from the







Note that even though ^ Xic is exports in industry i normalized by a country's GDP, every sector is
normalized by the same GDP, and thus they cancel out when we take the predicted export share.
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, \The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," The American Economic Review, June
2005, 95 (3), 546{579.
Aguayo-Tellez, Ernesto, Jim Airola, and Chinhui Juhn, \Did Trade Liberalization Help
Women? The Case of Mexico in the 1990s," SSRN eLibrary, 2010.
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn, \Fertility and the Plough," Working
Paper 16718, National Bureau of Economic Research January 2011.
Almeida, Heitor and Daniel Wolfenzon, \The eect of external nance on the equilibrium
allocation of capital," Journal of Financial Economics, January 2005, 75 (1), 133{164.
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Alan B. Krueger, \Computing Inequality: Have
Computers Changed The Labor Market?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, 113 (4),
1169{1213.
Beck, Thorsten, \Financial Dependence and International Trade," Review of International Eco-
nomics, 2003, 11 (2), 296{316.
26Black, Sandra E. and Chinhui Juhn,\The Rise of Female Professionals: Are Women Respond-
ing to Skill Demand?," The American Economic Review, May 2000, 90 (2), 450{455.
Braun, Matias and Claudio Raddatz,\The Politics of Financial Development: Evidence from
Trade Liberalization," The Journal of Finance, 2008, 63 (3), 1469{1508.
Do, Quy-Toan and Andrei A. Levchenko, \Comparative Advantage, Demand for External
Finance, and Financial Development," Journal of Financial Economics, December 2007, 86 (3),
796{834.
and , \Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions," Journal of Economic
Theory, 2009, 144, 1489{1520.
Frankel, Jerey A. and David Romer, \Does Trade Cause Growth?," American Economic
Review, June 1999, 89 (3), 379{399.
Galor, Oded and David N. Weil, \The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth," The American
Economic Review, June 1996, 86 (3), 374{387.
Hall, Robert and Charles Jones, \Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
per Worker then Others," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114, 83{116.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein,\Estimating Trade Flows: Trading
Partners and Trading Volumes," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008, 123 (2), 441{487.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten,\Penn World Table Version 6.1,"October
2002. Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP).
Jones, Ronald, A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History Trade, Balance of Pay-
ments, and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger,
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1971.
Levchenko, Andrei A., \Institutional Quality and International Trade," Review of Economic
Studies, 2007, 74 (3), 791{819.
Mussa, Michael, \Taris and the Distribution of Income: The Importance of Factor Specicity,
Substitutability, an Intensity in the Short and Long Run," Journal of Political Economy, 1974,
82, 1191{1203.
Oostendorp, Remco,\Globalization and the Gender Wage Gap,"World Bank Economic Review,
January 2009, 23 (1), 141{161.
Pitt, Mark M., Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Nazmul Hassan, \Human Capital Investment
and the Gender Division of Labor in a Brawn-Based Economy," SSRN eLibrary, 2010.
Qian, Nancy,\Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Eect of Sex-Specic Earnings
on Sex Imbalance*," Quarterly Journal of Economics, July 2008, 123 (3), 1251{1285.
27Rendall, Michelle,\Brain Versus Brawn: The Realization of Women's Comparative Advantage,"
SSRN eLibrary, 2010.
Romalis, John,\Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade,"American Economic
Review, 2004, 94 (67-97).
Roy, Andrew D., \Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings," Oxford Economic Papers,
June 1951, 3 (2), 135{146.
Santos Silva, J.M.C and Silvana Tenreyro, \The Log of Gravity," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 2006, 88 (4), 641{658.
Segura-Cayuela, Ruben, \Inecient Policies, Inecient Institutions and Trade," 2006. Banco
de Espa~ na Working Paper 0633.
28Table 1: Female Labor Dependence of Sectors
ISIC Code Sector Name Dependence
151 Meat, sh, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats 0.36
152 Dairy products 0.25
153 Grain mill, starch products, and prepared animal feeds 0.20
154 Other food products 0.39
155 Beverages 0.23
160 Tobacco products 0.33
171 Spinning, weaving and nishing of textiles 0.37
172 Other textiles 0.47
173 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 0.62
181 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 0.71
182 Fur and articles of fur 0.41
191 Leather and leather products 0.43
192 Footwear 0.49
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood 0.16
202 Products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 0.18
210 Paper and paper products 0.23
221 Publishing 0.33
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 0.29
223 Reproduction of recorded media 0.35
231 Coke oven products 0.14
232 Rened petroleum products 0.13
233 Nuclear fuel 0.11
241 Basic chemicals 0.15
242 Other chemical products 0.36
243 Man-made bres 0.22
251 Rubber products 0.23
252 Plastics products 0.27
261 Glass and glass products 0.19
269 Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 0.16
271 Basic iron and steel 0.10
272 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.13
273 Casting of metals 0.12
281 Structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs, steam generators 0.12
289 Other fabricated metal products 0.19
291 General purpose machinery 0.16
292 Special purpose machinery 0.14
293 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 0.28
29Table 1 (continued): Female Labor Dependence of Sectors
ISIC Code Sector Name Dependence
300 Oce, accounting and computing machinery 0.34
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 0.32
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 0.30
313 Insulated wire and cable 0.32
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 0.26
315 Electric lamps and lighting equipment 0.34
319 Other electrical equipment n.e.c. 0.42
321 Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 0.46
322 TV and radio transmitters; telephony and telegraphy apparatus 0.38
323 TV and radio receivers, sound or video apparatus 0.43
331 Medical appliances and instruments 0.38
332 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 0.45
333 Watches and clocks 0.42
341 Motor vehicles 0.09
342 Bodies for motor vehicles; trailers and semi-trailers 0.08
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 0.21
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.09
352 Railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 0.08
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 0.15
359 Transport equipment n.e.c. 0.21
361 Furniture 0.20
369 Manufacturing n.e.c. 0.38
371 Recycling of metal waste and scrap 0.17




Table 2: Summary Statistics for Female Labor Need of Exports
OECD Non-OECD
Mean St. Dev. Countries Mean St. Dev. Countries
1960s .251 .043 20 .271 .077 100
1970s .239 .034 20 .260 .078 103
1980s .244 .043 20 .269 .094 103
1990s .262 .043 20 .302 .111 123
2000s .256 .033 21 .293 .124 127
30Table 3a: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Countries,
1962-2007.
Highest Female Labor Need of Exports Lowest Female Labor Need of Exports
Lesotho 0.657 Nigeria 0.149
Bangladesh 0.531 Iran 0.148
Haiti 0.510 Algeria 0.148
Mauritius 0.479 Kazakhstan 0.141
Mongolia 0.446 Venezuela, RB 0.138
Cambodia 0.441 Gabon 0.138
Sri Lanka 0.433 Kuwait 0.137
Nepal 0.432 Saudi Arabia 0.137
Dominican Republic 0.425 Iraq 0.134
Pakistan 0.421 Libya 0.133
Table 3b: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Countries, 1960s.
Highest Female Labor Need of Exports Lowest Female Labor Need of Exports
Afghanistan 0.391 Iran 0.154
Mauritius 0.385 Gabon 0.149
Haiti 0.382 Chile 0.144
Pakistan 0.382 Zambia 0.136
Timor-Leste 0.379 Oman 0.135
Dominican Rep. 0.379 Venezuela 0.134
Cuba 0.378 Iraq 0.134
Sierra Leone 0.378 Libya 0.134
Mongolia 0.374 Kuwait 0.133
Hong Kong 0.369 Saudi Arabia 0.133
Table 3c: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Countries, 2000s.
Highest Female Labor Need of Exports Lowest Female Labor Need of Exports
Cambodia 0.660 Saudi Arabia 0.140
Haiti 0.658 Algeria 0.139
Lesotho 0.649 Gabon 0.139
Bangladesh 0.640 Venezuela 0.138
Honduras 0.576 Kuwait 0.138
Sri Lanka 0.550 Nigeria 0.138
Madagascar 0.535 Kazakhstan 0.136
Mongolia 0.533 Iraq 0.135
Mauritius 0.525 Libya 0.134
El Salvador 0.522 Liberia 0.125
31Table 4a: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Changers since
1960s.
Largest Increase in Female Labor Need of Exports Largest Decrease in Female Labor Need of Exports
Cambodia 0.423 Mozambique -0.094
Honduras 0.326 Liberia -0.095
Haiti 0.276 Sudan -0.114
Albania 0.233 Rwanda -0.115
Sri Lanka 0.226 Ecuador -0.131
Tunisia 0.223 Congo -0.136
Morocco 0.205 Chad -0.154
El Salvador 0.199 Niger -0.161
Madagascar 0.178 Yemen -0.168
Nicaragua 0.166 Angola -0.179
Note: Change is calculated as the dierence between the average Female Labor Need of Exports in
2000 and that in 1960.
Table 4b: Female Labor Need of Exports: Top 10 and Bottom 10 Changers since
1980s.
Largest Increase in Female Labor Need of Exports Largest Decrease in Female Labor Need of Exports
Cambodia 0.352 Uruguay -0.056
Honduras 0.238 Yemen -0.057
Albania 0.210 Burundi -0.059
Bangladesh 0.209 Liberia -0.062
Haiti 0.205 Papua New Guinea -0.068
Madagascar 0.194 Guinea-Bissau -0.081
Nicaragua 0.189 Rwanda -0.096
Sri Lanka 0.183 Afghanistan -0.129
El Salvador 0.164 Sudan -0.138
Tunisia 0.158 Chad -0.139
Note: Change is calculated as the dierence between the average Female Labor Need of Exports in
2000 and that in 1980.
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
(Log) Female Labor Need of Exports 146 3.29 0.35
(Log) Real GDP per capita 146 8.57 1.14
(Log) Openness 146 4.19 0.56
(Log) Female Years of Schooling 146 1.63 0.69
(Log) Fertility 146 1.15 0.55
(Log) Female Labor Force Participation 146 3.87 0.39
(Log) Population 146 16.05 1.38
(Log) Predicted Female Labor Need of Exports 146 -1.43 0.06
32Table 6: Sectoral Export Shares and Female Attainment Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Dep. Var.: Sectoral Share of Exports













Female Labor Intensity *
























Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.245 0.253 0.246 0.254 0.227 0.239
Observations 8,533 6,190 8,533 6,190 7,361 5,732
Panel B: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Sectoral Share of Exports
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes












































F-test 367.44 252.18 359.32 180.25 604.16 740.47
Partial R2 0.911 0.920 0.947 0.942 0.977 0.981
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at
1%. Female Labor Intensity (FLi) is the average fraction of female employees in a sector at the ISIC Rev.
3 three-digit level; Fertility Rate is total births per woman; Female Labor Force Participation (FLFP) is
female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Ratio of Female to Total Education is the
ratio of the Barro-Lee measures of female to total educational attainment. All of the variables are averages
over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is averaged over the period
1980-2007. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
33Table 7: Cross-Country Regression Results, 1962-2007
OLS 2SLS


































































































F-test 45.38 34.70 34.70 29.73
R2 0.385 0.387 0.387 0.397
Observations 146 146 146 126 146 146 146 126
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Fertility Rate is (log) total births per
woman; Female Labor Force Participation is (log) female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Female Educational Attainment is
the (log of) Barro-Lee measure of female educational attainment (average years of schooling among female population ages 15+ at ve-year intervals).
All of the variables are averages over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is averaged over the period 1980-2007.
Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
3
4Table 8: Panel Regression Results, 1962-2007
















































































Country Fixed Eects No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Eects No No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.609 0.929 0.938 0.113 0.968 0.508 0.949
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247 819 819 1,102 1,102
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Fertility Rate is (log) total births per
woman; Female Labor Force Participation is (log) female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Female Educational Attainment is
the (log of) Barro-Lee measure of female educational attainment (average years of schooling among female population ages 15+ at ve-year intervals).
All of the variables are ve-year averages over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is averaged over the period
1980-2007. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
3
5Table A1: Least and Most Female-Intensive Sectors, U.S. Data
Least Female-Intensive FLi Most Female-Intensive FLi
Logging 5.4 Other apparel and accessories 56.3
Coal Mining 5.7 Leather tanning and nishing 56.3
Cement, concrete, lime, and
gypsum
10.3 Retail bakeries 58
Sawmills and wood
preservation
11.3 Specialized design services 58
Nonmetallic mineral mining
and quarrying
11.5 Cut and sew apparel 66.1
Appendix Table A2: Summary Statistics, U.S.-based measure of FL
Mean Min Max SD N
Manufacturing 29.7 10.3 66.1 13.6 78
Non-manufacturing 25.8 5.4 58 15.6 15
36Appendix Table A3: Sectoral Export Shares and Female Attainment Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Dep. Var.: Sectoral Share of Exports
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.229 0.131 0.229 0.131 0.212 0.134
Observations 13,269 8,055 13,269 8,055 11,468 7,309
Panel B: 2SLS
Dep. Var.: Sectoral Share of Exports
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F-test 599.40 442.34 852.97 444.94 898.03 1053.12
Partial R2 0.913 0.927 0.950 0.949 0.976 0.981
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. Female Labor Intensity (FLi) is the average fraction of female employees in a sector at the four-
digit level of the US Census classication; Fertility Rate is total births per woman; Female Labor Force
Participation (FLFP) is female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Ratio of Female
to Total Education is the ratio of the Barro-Lee measures of female to total educational attainment. All of
the variables are averages over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is
averaged over the period 1980-2007. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
37Appendix Table A4: Cross-Country Regression Results, 1962-2007
OLS 2SLS


































































































F-test 20.19 15.95 15.95 14.01
R2 0.328 0.340 0.340 0.359
Observations 146 146 146 126 146 146 146 126
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Fertility Rate is (log) total births per
woman; Female Labor Force Participation is (log) female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Female Educational Attainment is
the (log of) Barro-Lee measure of female educational attainment (average years of schooling among female population ages 15+ at ve-year intervals).
All of the variables are averages over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is averaged over the period 1980-2007.
Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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8Appendix Table A5: Panel Regression Results, 1962-2007
















































































Country Fixed Eects No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Eects No No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.610 0.927 0.936 0.083 0.968 0.512 0.950
Observations 1,247 1,247 1,247 819 819 1,102 1,102
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Fertility Rate is (log) total births per
woman; Female Labor Force Participation is (log) female labor participation rate (% of female population ages 15+); Female Educational Attainment is
the (log of) Barro-Lee measure of female educational attainment (average years of schooling among female population ages 15+ at ve-year intervals).
All of the variables are ve-year averages over the period 1962-2007, except for Female Labor Force Participation, which is averaged over the period
1980-2007. Variable denitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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